



The Gift of Acting
Abstract: This section deals with certain preconceptions 
concerning thought, affect, and physicality. The jouissance 
of actors at play is examined: the knowledge and 
intelligence of their bodies, and their linguistic abilities in 
dialogue and communication with one another, as well as 
the art within their repetitions. All of these qualities and 
skills are accompanied by a physical feeling of not being 
the sovereign subject of one’s own acting. The embodied 
dispositif of the Enlightenment proves to be an illusion 
when tested on one’s own body, a chimera that gets in the 
way of acting.
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Skipping
Actors often step out of line. They are not necessarily protesting against 
anything in particular. Politics is not usually their strong point. They just 
do not like being domesticated. It is hard to be creative if you let yourself 
be constrained by society’s rules. Creativity is always also about breaking 
rank. Hardly any artistic work can be done without fractures and fis-
sures, without the desire for – and need of – a surplus of independence 
and freedom.
But what is it that leads actors in particular to fall out of line, to resist 
the restrictions of conformity? Do they share some characteristic that 
explains their penchant for this particular brand of insubordination?
Looking more closely at the idiom “to step out of line,” it is interesting 
that disturbing the given order is combined with the verb to step. Despite 
the military drums that measure these steps, the image to which this 
idiom gives rise is not necessarily confrontational. Instead we visualize 
a superfluous, unruly sidestep, a liberation from constraint – twisting 
away, not putting up fists. If we think of a line dance, what does this sole 
dancer who disobeys the rules do? Before our inner eye, we see them 
leave the rigid formation, deviate from the choreography, and start to 
skip. Just because. Because it is fun and because being good and follow-
ing orders is so boring, so monotonous. If you like, you can imagine a 
guileless gaze to go with this small skip, or a satisfied smile that comes 
from the pleasure of the unseemly.
When we look at it like this, the destructiveness of disturbance is 
playfully transformed into musical dissonance.
Read in this way, actors’ general propensity to resist norms and 
transgress set rules can be seen as a kind of side-stepping leap. It is a 
guileless carrying-on that is driven by fantasy, by the joy of creation. 
It is the way children sometimes skip exuberantly when they have not 
yet been “tamed” and still playfully express their lust for life. Even Plato 
mentioned this tendency of the young to skip unexpectedly for no dis-
cernable reason: “For men say that the young of all creatures cannot be 
quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move 
and cry out; some leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportive-
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ness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of cries.”1 Sensible 
adults do not usually act this way. It would be improper and embarrass-
ing. Adults may not always be well-mannered and demure, but they do 
not act like fools. That is what is expected of them and, of course, they 
fulfill these expectations. They follow the same drummer or perhaps the 
whistle. They march in rank and file if told to and even let themselves be 
drilled, whatever the cost. Children are not as easy to train. Discipline 
gets in their way. It conflicts with their need to move, to play. If you do 
not make them walk calmly beside you, they immediately start to skip 
and dance, or to dally. Just for fun, out of pure joy, for pleasure. They 
are driven by teeming, overflowing energy that cannot be administered 
and that no one can make money out of. There is no understanding this 
logically. That small, unplanned, extra skip just emerges for no evident 
reason, with no particular aim. It justifies itself, just as art and friendship 
exist for their own sake.
Can’t the actor, homo ludens, be characterized by just this playful over-
flow? At work and at home, in disposition and habitus. Isn’t his perma-
nent openness to escapades the precise source of his creativity, which 
society half admires and envies and half disdains?
Max Reinhardt’s language is strange to us today. We tend to be put off 
by the way he speaks, because the words he chooses no longer speak to 
us. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to repeat here the famous line from 
his “Rede über den Schauspieler,” his lecture about acting held in 1928 at 
Columbia University:
I believe in the immortality of the theater, it is the most joyous hidea-
way for all those who have secretly stuck their childhood into their 
pockets and run off with it, to play on to the end of their days.2 
What else is Reinhardt talking about in this declaration of love other 
than the actor’s talent for that superfluous, childish skip, the jump for joy 
1 Plato, The Laws, Book II, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Prometheus Books, 2000), 34. 
See also Johannes Bilstein, “Spiel-Glück und Glücks-Spiele,” in Maske und Kothurn, Dies ist 
kein Spiel 4 (2008), 69.
2 Max Reinhardt, “Rede über den Schauspieler,” in Hugo Fetting (ed.) Leben für das Theater. 
Briefe, Reden, Aufsätze, Interviews, Gespräche, Auszüge aus Regiebüchern (Berlin: Argon 
Verlag, 1989), 436.
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that shifts the world and life itself back into the realm of the unpredict-
able? Whether it is a comedy or a tragedy, this fragility of the prescribed 
is not limited to any particular content or development. It is part of all 
performative power which, in actuality, becomes the act, the manifesta-
tion, the event.
Usually, actors do not advocate any explicitly political cause. But are they 
not nevertheless per se “political” insofar as we might consider them to 
be the subversive disrupters of any behavior that acquiesces with the 
system? No matter what the performance is about, is not their propen-
sity for a surprise turn, an unpredictable, gratuitous jump, is not their 
overflowing imagination and everything that continually seduces them 
to make up their language and inflection, their movements and their 
acts, is not this their own special form of resistance to all prescribed 
ways of thinking, to all norm-referenced behavior? In that superfluous 
skip, are not actors able to use the opportunity for free play that has 
been granted to them, to indulge in a little distancing dance (Dis-tanz) 
against the metalanguage of marketization and efficiency that has begun 
to increasingly pressure and rule over us all?
Prejudice
Prejudices simplify. They pack a punch and therefore live long. You think 
you have risen above them, that they have died, and then they unexpect-
edly peek out from behind the wings, or from the heads and hearts of 
the actors in which they have been slumbering. They are just waiting for 
their cue. In this case, it is the prejudice against thinking. This antipathy 
has built itself a nice little nest. As if thinking were the enemy of artistic, 
and thus also of performative, talent. As if imagination and creativity 
were not just disturbed and inhibited by the act of thinking, but poi-
soned and thwarted. As if sensuousness competed with the intellect and 
one needed to secede from, or even be sacrificed to, the other.
“Don’t think, play!” (Denk’ net, spü!) is an admonition sometimes heard 
in the theaters of Vienna. Speaking of prejudice, perhaps this distaste for 
thinking is a Viennese phenomenon. Maybe it is in the Viennese blood, 
the blood of this city that is so head over heels in love with the theater. 
Maybe. Who knows? But what other city still calls its stars Lieblinge? 
 Actors and the Art of Performance
DOI: 10.1057/9781137596345.0012
I have even heard one of these darlings, bumped into by accident, call 
out “don’t push me, I’m a Liebling.” But anecdotes aside, where else do 
people fight so vehemently about theater, where else are actors honored 
so publicly as in Vienna? In life and in death. Honorary members of 
the Burgtheater Vienna have the privilege of – it is true! – being laid 
out after death at the top of the theater’s grand staircase. A black carpet 
replaces the red for the occasion, and the entrance is draped with silver-
tasseled black velvet curtains. The gravity of the curtains and the change 
from the theater’s usual red and gold to the black and silver of death 
creates a powerful effect. People automatically pause, stop what they are 
doing to look. It is impossible to ignore this signal. The Grim Reaper 
makes his presence known and evokes strong images. After an official 
mourning ceremony on the staircase, with much aplomb in the presence 
of members of the government and, of course, the Burgtheater board, 
the pallbearers perform a ritual circling of the theater accompanied by 
a band, colleagues, fans, and passersby. It even used to be customary for 
the procession to circle the theater three times.
This is how Vienna shows its love for its departed actors. Eros and 
Thanatos are, of course, particularly intimate to Vienna, the city of 
Sigmund Freud, which leads us to another way of reading the actor’s 
old prejudice against thinking. Could it be the return of the repressed, 
emotional remnants of Austro–Catholic Baroque resistance against 
Prusso–Protestant intellectualization and ideologization of the perfor-
mative arts?
Curtain on the small jumps and skips. Curtain on the escapades.
The idea that thinking is the enemy of performative talent is not only 
questionable but also worth interrogating. Moving beyond the countless 
anecdotes about Viennese theater and a possible geographical/cultural 
heritage, the question remains as to what practical value theoretical and 
aesthetic reflection might hold for actors. Let others worry about that. I 
just want to act. Why shouldn’t we just preserve the proven division of 
labor and leave theory – theoria – to the directors, dramatic advisers, 
theater studies majors, and, last but not least, the arts and theater pages. 
Why? Because with time it makes a difference whether or not an actor 
has also been interested in theory, in the power of discourses past and 
present. And it makes not just a theoretical difference but also a differ-
ence in corporeal experience. This knowledge informs his acting. Slowly, 
successively, it becomes inscribed in his body whether or not he has 
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tried out or ignored different aesthetic forms, whether he has asked or 
refrained from asking ethical questions, and whether and how he has 
answered the question of art. The answer he has given will give his face 
an expression, will make his body matter or not,3 and with time, in the 
course of an actor’s life, it will bring out the difference between one actor 
and another. You only need to watch the stage closely. This is not a moral 
judgment. Luckily, it takes all kinds.
The question remains of the concept of thinking that is inimical to 
actors. What do actors, and by no means only actors, mean by thinking 
when this prejudice takes hold of their heads and hearts?
Theater and thinking have long had an ambivalent relationship involving 
a conflict, the roots of which go back to antiquity.
On the one hand, ancient philosophers considered the act of thinking, in anal-
ogy to theater, as the practice of contemplation (theoria), in which the person 
philosophizing could, in a state of amazement (thaumázeo) apprehend the 
actual truth (óntos on theós). On the other hand, Plato in particular believed 
theater was the adversary of thinking because, due to its intimacy with the 
realm of the emotions, it is closest to that part of being human which is furthest 
removed from the best in us – the noetic realm of reason.4
Is this philosophy’s early, precritical, defensive reaction to theater as 
the barbarism of affect – and has theater avenged the critical abilities 
of thought with an accusation of the tyranny of reason? Is this the fly in 
the ointment? What about the excluded middle? The devil only knows 
where the excluded middle has got to.
This is not to gloss over, ignore, or belittle the differences between the 
characteristics of philosophers and actors. These differences are valu-
able. Not everybody can or should be able to do everything. Different 
professions require different proclivities that must be defended, whether 
contentiously or with longing. But what are these characteristics?
3 Butler, Bodies That Matter.
4 Arno Böhler, “TheatrReales Denken,” in idem., and Susanne Granzer (ed.), Ereignis 
Denken. TheatRealität–Performanz–Ereignis (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2009), 11.
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Which traits does the actor acquire due to his profession and which 
the philosopher? And where are their respective blind spots? What is 
underexposed and ignored, because the thinker and the player are 
deaf to them, whether out of conviction or just the pretense that this 
or that ability is contraindicative and would not be good for their own 
profession?
What is this assumption grounded upon, this preconceived opinion, 
this ominous pool of mutual distrust? What do we stand to lose? What is 
shut out, forgotten? And what set in stone?
Subject-based thinking versus stage experience
The theatrical subject is not an autonomous subject. This is the disquiet-
ing, irritating experience of being on stage.
On a non-discursive level, this quickly becomes clear in the praxis 
of acting. The actor acts within his material embodiment; he cannot 
disregard it or skip over it. It makes him unable to cheat himself. He 
has obviously been given over to his body, and whatever else he does, 
he has to let it play. It has a say whether he likes it or not. Because 
of this “medial” character of acting, instrumental reason soon has to 
forfeit its position of authority. While the possibility of success is cer-
tainly related to the actor’s ability and talent, it remains at the mercy 
of the fragile and lucky felicitousness of the performance. All actors, 
not just stage actors, must capitulate to the providence of felicitous 
success.
That rubs us the wrong way. The enlightenment idea of the subject is 
the other way around. Subjectivity is rather “the power of success – [ ... ] 
the ability to let effective acts succeed. The name of this ability or power 
to permit success is ‘reason.’”5 Enlightenment as subject-based thinking 
thus means being liberated into the autonomy of our free will, given the 
all-encompassing power of reason.
Reason should guarantee that we can allow reality to succeed, that we 
can bring it under our subjective control. This is what we have learned; it 
5 Christoph Menke, “Subjektivität und Gelingen: Adorno – Derrida,” in Eva L.-Waniek 
and Erik M. Vogt (eds.), Derrida und Adorno – Zur Aktualität von Dekonstruktion und 
Frankfurter Schule (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2008), 190. Unpublished translation by Gerrit 
Jackson.
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is deeply ingrained in us. And in all truth, who can resist the exonerating 
prospect of holding the key to success in their own two hands? Every fail-
ure thus becomes something we have done and consequently something 
we can repair if we only enhance and develop our ability. That takes away 
the uncertain and tragic elements of living that sometimes befall us as if 
from some external source. In light of the blows and breakdowns that 
no doubt everyone knows, you have to admit that a “reason machine” 
sounds pretty attractive, a lot more seductive than being exposed to the 
unassailable difference that connects ability and felicitous success. It is 
much better to optimistically rescind the difference between ability and 
success, between talent and felicity and identify each separately, ignoring 
the uncontrolled overflow inherent to their connection. An apologetics 
of numerals quietly begins to thrive.
On this occasion, we might be proud to present Herr Calculator in a Viennese 
farce perhaps entitled Skirmish on Wall Street or Lady Luck’s Frame of Mind. 
He is wearing a crown on his head that has slipped down at an angle and he 
looks a bit disheveled despite his custom-made suit and expensive tie. But he 
smiles unperturbed – and the public greets its Liebling with roaring applause. 
Curtain. 
The concept of enlightenment as the “(affirmative) theory of the sub-
ject’s power, of the subject as power”6 still – despite critical theory, 
poststructuralism, and deconstruction – infiltrates the idea we have of 
ourselves. Its modern form, subject-based thinking, “reduces whatever 
it may encounter as the substance of a sensation or a thought [ ... ] to the 
subject of this sensation or this thought.”7 And this reduction is the base 
from which we automatically create the soups and sauces of ideas. This 
return to enlightenment subject-based thinking is archived thought; it 
has already taken place in the past. It is history that has entered our 
bodies. We can observe it in our own habitus and that of others. Our 
flesh and blood is the site of this archive, whether we know it or not 
and whether we like it or not. Subject-based thinking is so ingrained it 
seems “natural” to us. It is our historical homestead, our calvary. It lives 
in the syntax of our language, in the underlying structure of subject 
and predicate, which suggests that “I” always “do” something, that “I” 
6 Ibid., 189.
7 Ibid.
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am master over “my” actions. Our grammar constantly turns us into 
perpetrators.8
Thus we break with and ignore everything to do with passivity, with 
the pathic, with everything that can and does befall us without warn-
ing. The ego is seen not only as the precondition of being able to feel 
something but also and at the same time as the cause of and reason for 
those feelings. However, while the ego is the precondition for being able 
to feel something, feelings do not introduce themselves; rather, we are 
overcome by them. We are stricken by them. Disappointment hurts, fear 
lames us, hate distorts us, and we are thrown into chaos. Calamities befall 
us; happiness is not something we can calculate, not even the happiness 
of the high card, the greatest number.
Theater is incendiary. It can inflame the enlightenment concept of the 
subject and the pragmatism of analytical abstract thought, which seeks 
to calm itself with quantifiable criteria. The stage attacks the dominance 
of such rational, causal thought. The ego is exposed; its sovereignty is 
assaulted, shaken at its core because of this vulnerable exposition. This is 
meant as a literal occurrence, not as a figurative image. A painful event 
that causes discomfort. Offends. The tower of our modern self-assurance 
begins to crack. Not theoretically, but dramatically, involving all senses. 
Physically, because on stage the actor has to deliver, with his own body, 
the tenacious problem of modernity’s collective interpretation of the self. 
He is forced into facing the experience that the ego is not the master of 
its own house, that whether or not he succeeds is not a matter of free 
will. He has no control over it, and no normative structure in the world 
can give it to him. No talent, no system, no method. Whether or not his 
acting is felicitous is out of his hands and thus uncertain. It is bestowed 
upon him.
8 “Language belongs in its origin to the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology: 
we find ourselves in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the basic presup-
positions of the metaphysics of language – which is to say, of reason. It is this which sees 
everywhere deed and doer; this which believes in will as cause in general; this which 
believes in the ‘ego’, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its 
belief in the ego-substance on to all things [ ... ].” Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin 1990), 48. Italics in the original. 
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This is the unexpected earnestness that the actor faces, the thorn in his 
flesh. Neither success nor failure can help him over this hurdle, and it is 
something that plagues his whole career, not just its beginnings.9 Make 
no mistake about that. No matter how long an actor practices his art, no 
matter how much ability he acquires over time, no matter how well he 
masters the craft, he will never lose his own shadow. Whether or not his 
acting is felicitous will always be up in the air. The eventfulness of play-
ing in the theater necessarily leads the actor to oscillate between power 
and impotence,10 between activity and passivity, between being perpe-
trator and victim. In-between. These contradictions are inadequately, 
paradoxically bound to one another. Promising and ominous.
Master and servant
“‘I’m my own master’ said the servant, and cut off his foot.”11 That is 
Bertolt Brecht’s caustic ironic comment on the subject of master and 
slave. Not a bad theatrical description of the physical attacks, the wounds 
inflicted upon the actor “by himself.” For the prevailing subject, the 
discovery of the unassailable difference between ability and success, 
between power and impotence, between acting and being acted upon 
becomes a “bloody” self-injury. The ego is subjected to “amputation” of 
and by its own body, which rebels. Is it perhaps even “beheaded,” cut 
down?
There is a German theater saying: “The other actors play the king.” No 
one can act the role of ruler believably if his or her colleagues do not 
play along. Even the best actor is powerless to change that. The ego on 
stage is in a similar predicament. No one is letting him play king. It is 
not working. The ego, the king, has been dethroned. He is a servant 
in his own house, but it is not because of how colleagues are acting, or 
because of a critic who wrote a bad review, or a booing audience. No, it 
  9 These problems should not be confused with whether or not an actor has “talent.” That is 
not what this is about. In this study of actors, their talent is a given.
10 Sybille Krämer, “Was ist ein Medium? Über Boten, Engel, Viren, Geld und andere 
Medien,” in GRENZ-film (ed.), Philosophy On Stage (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2007).
11 Bertolt Brecht, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, trans. Stefan Brecht, (Oxford: Heinemann, 
1976).
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is a narcissistic wound that the subject inflicts upon itself. Threatened 
by its own self, it can no longer be sure of itself. Without wanting to, it 
becomes lost, loses itself. That is the wound.
The continuous acid test that the actor must undergo is that his profes-
sion physically forces him not only to endure but also to be the carrier of 
the unwelcome incursion of passivity. He is at the mercy of the paradox 
of doing and leaving be, and he must, if he is to act well, embody the 
creative fusion of actio and passio within his being.
Despite everything that has been said about the stage, one could at 
this point just shrug one’s shoulders and retort that in the 21st century, 
the problems posed by the early modern concept of the subject have long 
been overcome. We have understood them, caught up with them, and 
gone beyond them. Why insist upon the actor’s embodied effect?
Why?
Since the actor is our guinea pig, to answer why, we should examine 
the practice of theater and look at one of the problems we often see in 
beginners. A role is attempted for the first time. Preliminary stage direc-
tions are developed. During the rehearsals to follow, this first draft takes 
on a life of its own. Many young actors automatically follow these initial 
directions as if they were remote controlled. They stand at the same cue, 
sit down at the same cue, lie down at the same cue, and so forth (and their 
speech follows this same pattern). It is as if the directions were an invis-
ible safety rail that they must hold on to, which gives them unfounded 
confidence in their vulnerable state. They follow the directions “without 
thinking,” as we say. Extraordinarily, the actors themselves are unaware 
of this. It happens without their registering it. What is more, when the 
play begins to take off, beginners often return to the old stage directions. 
In an emotional situation, they seem to reappear by themselves and 
superimpose themselves on newer solutions.
In light of this phenomenon, with regard to a grand narrative such as 
the Enlightenment, we must ask, what is the inscription of a few hours 
compared to the inscription of a few centuries?
The theorist is in a different position. He is spared the passion of the 
actor. His performances are first and foremost conceptual, not sensate. He 
reflects humankind’s historical self-interpretation from a distance. While 
these ideas befall the actor’s body and grab him by the collar, the theorist 
keeps them at bay with his intellect, so he may understand them abstractly. 
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When the theorist questions the concept of the physical body, he can keep 
it from getting to his own body. He objectifies it reflectively, looks at it 
from the outside. That he thus disregards his own materiality is a fact that 
is usually overlooked. And the theorist, protected by the distance of reflec-
tion, can also overlook this fact, since he only thinks formally about the 
physical nature of his own subjectivity. His task is to fulfill the scientific 
maxim of objectivity; otherwise, his work is given no credence.
This is not to say that the theorist has no passion. But the historical/
cultural placement of the ego outside the body means that the theoreti-
cian’s body is only theoretically, not practically, in the line of fire of his 
thought. His battlefield is the paper, the computer screen; it is not (his 
own) flesh that is under attack.12 To deconstruct a reigning discourse in 
writing is not the same as to correct, transform, and supplement it physi-
cally, with one’s own body. This demands great exertion, because one’s 
own phenomenal body,13 with all historically contingent inscriptions, 
also plays a role. It must break all resistance, overcome all automatic 
behavior. The body starts acting up when forced to leave its usual, daily 
territory.14 It expresses its own desires, begins to live an unwanted life of 
its own, which (usually) is not even noticed by the person himself, or, 
if so, only as a diffuse feeling of physical indisposition, as a feeling of 
embarrassment.
12 On the 20th-century rediscovery of the “flesh” as a philosophical category, see Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968).
13 On the term “phenomenal body,” see Fischer-Lichte, chapter 4. In this chapter she dis-
cusses the problem of the traditional dichotomy of body and mind in Western thought: 
“Man is embodied mind. [ ... ] The mind cannot exist without the body; it articulates itself 
through physicality” (99). She sees an astonishing parallel in the work of the great man 
of Polish theater Jerzy Grotowski: “The actor no longer lends his body to an exclusively 
mental process but makes the mind appear through the body, thus granting the body 
agency” (82), and in the late philosophy of Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible: 
“The body is always already connected to the world through its ‘flesh.’ [ ... ] In this sense, 
the body transcends each of its instrumental and semiotic functions through its fleshi-
ness” (83).
14 For example, the body that best fits today’s fitness and beauty ideal is of limited use to 
meet the demands of theater. It is too hard, too impervious, a block of muscle that blocks 
the breath from flowing. Releasing these tensions and blockages takes hard work and 
patience.
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“I wish you wouldn’t keep appearing and vanishing so suddenly: you 
make one quite giddy,” says Alice to the Cheshire Cat “‘All right,’ said the 
Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the 
tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest 
of it had gone. ‘Well! I’ve often seen a cat without a grin,’ thought Alice; 
‘but a grin without a cat! It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in my 
life!’”15
Reworking the cultural and personally codified archive in one’s own 
body and replacing the significant material traces of the body’s ritual 
repetitiveness, its norms and registers, with new ones at the material 
site of their occurrence is difficult, more difficult than one would imag-
ine. This kind of deconstruction and critical transformation of one’s 
own body hurts. It cannot occur without passion. It carries pathos in 
itself.
The actor is exposed by this pathos of the flesh. He cannot ignore 
it, cannot disregard his own materiality. He must be creative in the 
conditions of his own embodiment. There is no way he cannot literally 
trip over himself and fall. The physical exposition of his art automati-
cally confronts him with all the phenomena of human existence, with 
all its individual, cultural, and historical inscriptions. And he must 
carry and deliver all of his “flaws” and all his “insights” within his own 
body.
For this reason, the figure of the actor is a good subject of study in the 
laboratory of being. The rejected and neglected passive side of our exist-
ence passes before our eyes; the actor makes us see the two-edged gift 
of the event of his exposure, so that we, like Alice in Wonderland, must 
admit to the subject’s fear of and resistance to the jump down the rabbit 
hole into a world in which there can be a “grin without a cat,” and so 
that we, like Alice, must concede that we have no control over success 
or failure, that we cannot optimistically abolish their difference, cannot 
rely solely on our autonomy. We are exposed to, and at the mercy of an 
Other, a stranger who has no name. And one fine day, this exposure will 
be final.
15 Carroll, 84.
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In the end, the most powerful theatrical moments are maybe even 
enactments of the “death of the subject.” And perhaps this staging, the 
pinnacle of what theater can be, is exactly what Heiner Müller means 
by death in transformation, for him a core element of theater that unites 
audience and actors in their fear of this transformation – because it is, at 
least, a fear we can count on.
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Friedrich Nietzsche: The Twilight of the Idols 
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One has to learn to see, one has to learn to think, one 
has to learn to speak and write: the end in all three is a 
noble culture. – Learning to see – habituating the eye to 
repose, to patience, to letting things come to it; learning 
to defer judgment, to investigate and comprehend the 
individual case in all its aspects. This is the first prelimi-
nary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately 
to a stimulus [ ... ].16 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 76. Italics in the original.
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Bodies on stage
On stage, the imagined world and the reflexive distance it offers do not 
exist. The stage demands that the actor give his all, not just his intellect. 
His entire phenomenal body is needed, from head to toe; no part may be 
missing – the whole of his anatomy is required, as well as the bodies of 
the other cast members and, of course, those of the audience.
Theater is an ecstatic art. It is the actor’s profession to stick his neck 
out, to risk his palpable body in the act of performing in front of specta-
tors/witnesses. There is no hiding place, no procrastinating, no rewind 
or fast forward, no technical means of correction after the fact. What 
happens now has happened – time bursts open – creates a gap – an 
empty space – through and throughout the actor – the event of acting 
ambushes the actor suddenly and ruthlessly – and the idea of man as a 
sovereign subject becomes an obstacle to playing, a conflict.
As soon as someone acts seriously, not just fooling around and flirt-
ing with the art of theater, they feel the full brunt of what it means to 
have dedicated themselves to acting as an event. The paradigm for this 
phenomenon is the premiere. Premieres create incredible tension, even 
for those who are good at hiding it. The body automatically sends out 
uncontrollable signals. The actor’s stomach becomes queasy, his hands 
sweat, his mouth is dry, and he has to pace back and forth or leave 
quickly because his bladder is bursting, again. The signs may differ, but 
all actors are nervous, be they beginners or old hands. Everyone’s heart 
beats faster before they go out on the open stage, knowing that they will 
soon be exposed to the eyes of the public. Anyone who says otherwise 
is lying. The actor’s body is in a state of alarm. The heart beats faster, 
the breath quickens, and there is an outpouring of adrenaline like before 
a date you have been anticipating or dreading, one where you do not 
know what is going to happen, but you would not miss it for the world. 
The prospect of this moment of unassailability both exerts a pull and 
repels. Fear and desire shake hands.
The dilemma faced by the modern, enlightened actor stems from the 
subcutaneous malignant paradox described above. The act of acting is 
per se in contradiction to the modern idea of the self, while it simul-
taneously and automatically draws from this archived idea of the self. 
This forces the actor into a peculiar physical state of passion. He cannot 
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shed the skin of modernity; he is not a reptile. But at the same time, the 
creative event of acting insists on the porosity of his skin; it must be torn 
open ecstatically, become permeable.
In the limelight of the stage, with no cloak of invisibility at hand, 
“naked” – no script in hand, no rostrum to hide behind, without the 
shield of scientific neutrality and with the pressure of performative 
quality – the traditional master–slave relationship of corporeality and 
intellect is instantly reversed.17 The play can no longer be delivered from 
the spirits it has called. The body has been turned on; it surges, begins to 
duplicate itself – and there is no wise sorcerer in sight. He has vanished 
from the story. The body can only throw its own weight around; the 
body itself matters and acts on its own authority.18 Usually a slave, a lowly 
apprentice, the body now takes over the controls. It has no shame and it 
has low standards. For example, it may act like a lump of clay. No matter 
how nicely it is talked to, despite all the cajoling, it may remain clumsy 
and wooden. Suddenly, novice actors have not two, but four arms and 
legs. What do I do with my hands? Everything becomes a problem. They’re 
suddenly dangling so weirdly like they don’t belong to me, alien. Just standing 
there without immediately putting his hands into his pockets – a favorite 
gesture of male novice actors – just standing there without looking like 
he has been bolted to the ground and without bolting, going to stand 
somewhere else because he just cannot bear it and feels like he has to do 
something; just standing can become the most difficult of tasks. It may 
sound hackneyed, but to be on stage, exposed to the eyes of others, and to 
“believably” act some daily task naturally, not cramped, not stiff, without 
clichés – simply but focused – is a higher art than is commonly believed. 
Actors experience the paradoxical phenomenon that a dominant will, 
the usual instrument of autonomous action, is counterproductive to 
engaging acting. The will gets in the way, literally. It initiates a process of 
self-observation that censors breathing and imagination. It is the critic 
who gives grades, the superego that appraises, argues, judges, and passes 
out sentences. Blocks are preprogrammed, innocence lost. At the same 
time, the actor depends upon his will. He needs it. Without it he cannot 
17 On the transvaluation of the ideal body–mind relationship in Nietzsche’s philosophy, see 
Volker Gerhardt, “Die ‘große Vernunft’ des Leibes. Ein Versuch über Zarathustras vierte 
Rede,” in idem (ed.), Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 2000), 123–163.
18 On the weight of the body, see Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Corpus.
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act, cannot perform a single action. Even if he is only walking, he needs 
to know why he is walking and where to, or his walk has no destination 
or reason because he wants to express that this act of walking has no des-
tination and no reason. Without willful acts, without intention, no play 
can be performed, much less repeated. Even in a happening, a happening 
is what is supposed to happen and its elements are all the playthings of 
the actor’s intention.
Innocence of becoming
Simultaneous dependency on the effectiveness of and on the absence 
of the will is a paradoxical problem no intellect can solve. It throws the 
actor into a state of contradiction. The greatest contradiction is the fact 
that his regulatory reason, his ratio, cannot control his will and must 
make space for capricious fabulation. Without the power of imagina-
tion, without creative inventiveness – which, diametrically opposed to 
conceptual reason, never has an inkling of its “results” – there can be no 
artistic work.
But it is easier to write or read about this late modern collapse than to put 
it into action oneself. This is the apex, the raw nerve, of the art of acting. 
The highest demands are made of the professional actor – impossible for 
a lay actor – by the paradox present in every production. Every evening, 
in opposition to the mythology of modernity, he must surrender to the 
innocence of becoming.19 Again and again he must willfully step into the 
voltage field of opposed poles, the conflicting powers of this innocence 
of becoming. The ability to meet this challenge is the actor’s know-how 
(techne). It is a long way to the intentionless intention20 of acting on 
stage.
19 “What alone can our teaching be – That no one gives a human being his qualities: not 
God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not he himself ” (the nonsensical idea; last 
rejected here was propounded as ‘intelligible freedom’ by Kant, and perhaps also by Plato 
before him). Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 65. Italics in the original.
20 For Immanuel Kant, pleasure, which determines taste, is completely uninteresting, a pur-
poseless purposiveness. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul 
Guyer (ed.) and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 89f.
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But if you are only watching from below, it is difficult to understand the 
problems that arise. When an actor fails, you ask yourself what’s their 
problem up there on stage, it can’t be that difficult. When he is triumphant, 
you feel vindicated, because it looks so easy, so playfully easy. Learning all 
those lines by heart, that’s difficult! But walking, standing, sitting down at the 
right moment?
There is an image that is quite popular among theater people for the art 
of innocence: the way a stagehand strolls across the stage. Nothing else 
happens, nothing more exciting. He just walks – and all eyes are suddenly 
upon him. Not because he has disrupted the rehearsal and everyone 
automatically looks to see who is bothering them and waits impatiently 
until he is finally backstage again. No, it is that there is something simply 
riveting about the way he does it, the way he just walks. I can do that 
too, you might think. Anyone can do that. Walking, simply walking. We’ve 
all been walking since we were toddlers. But the innocence of the layperson, 
who does not even realize he is being watched, is easily lost when for 
whatever reason he is required to play. Very easily. You only need to 
ask the layperson to repeat his perfect, suggestive stroll in the same way. 
Already you have brought him down to reality, mixed with astonishment 
at the fact that it really is not as easy as it looks. Because just strolling 
across stage as if you were that stagehand and also making all eyes fall 
on you curiously, this innocence of the artist must be ranked higher. Many 
requirements must be met by the experts in being on stage.
“Being on stage,” as a performative art, cannot be achieved by sys-
tematically replacing professional actors with laypeople. Theater as a 
physical event, when it works, is high art and nothing to do with the 
expert hermetics often attributed to the professional actor. Acting is an 
act of extreme vulnerability and fragility. It is not that laypeople cannot 
exhibit these qualities, but rather that the qualities of laypeople and art-
ists are not interchangeable. They should not be played off against each 
other. Neither resentment nor trendiness should have the last word, but 
instead curiosity about the diversity of aesthetic forms.
The crux of the problem – as regards professional acting – resides in the 
personal, conscious participation in walking, standing, talking, and so 
on. There is no action without an actor. Walking, standing, talking, and 
so forth cannot be done without some-body who walks, who stands, 
who talks. The infinitive is indeterminate, all action is abstract and 
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meaningless when no-body is doing it. Without players, there is no play; 
physical presence is the fundamental element of theater. The stage needs 
people who walk, talk, and stand. Again, it requires flesh-and-blood 
actors from head to toe – and this two-sided, unrelinquishable condition 
is the root of all problems in acting.
It is not a pleasant feeling when the weight of your body, your body’s 
matter, matters so much, when your body is suddenly confronted with its 
own intractability. Were you not done with that after puberty? Not only 
do the demands of acting and the gaze of the Others make your body 
self-conscious, make it suddenly feel like a block of wood, but the body 
itself also begins to act out its own particular blockades, the weak points 
that everyone likes to hide from themselves. It is embarrassing how much 
the body reveals. It tells intimate secrets the actor would prefer to keep 
hidden. What is more, contrary to the actor’s intentions, it reproduces 
all sorts of clichés, all sorts of conventional, normed behavior he did not 
know, or would have denied, he carried in himself. It is terrible to watch 
yourself literally embodying individual and historical conditioning that 
you thought you had overcome, were sure you were free of. It is terrible 
that is just happens, although you know better. The body’s memory just 
automatically acts and reacts the way men and women just are, the way 
they simply act and react.21 This is not to say that theater does not work 
with the idiosyncrasies of the individual actors, with their differences, 
their contradictions, and their resistance. Of course it draws on the 
quirks and characteristics of people and thus works with the pleasure 
and critique of stereotypes and clichés. But in this interpretation of the 
actor’s art, they do not stem from the exposition of a private sphere that 
cannot be invaded, but from a manner of playing. The actor is not, as it 
were, “authentically” presenting his own “empirical data.” Acting in the 
sense of poiesis is dedicated to the open future. It does not only document 
the reality it portrays, it does not only mirror – in pain and joy – the past 
and present that has marked the person in his or her lifetime.
21 On the construction of gender norms, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: 
Routledge, 1990).
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Language and speaking
One of the characters in Peter Handke’s Voyage to the Sonorous Land or 
The Art of Asking is named Parzifal. Parzifal cannot stand being ques-
tioned. He reacts aggressively to each question. Otherwise he has no 
words; he is silent. Only once, listening to a story about death, does he 
slowly begin to stutter and speak. But while speaking he is overcome, 
as if he had known, by a new frenzy. He is overtaken by a compulsion 
to speak. Phrase after phrase leaves his mouth; he cannot stop the flow. 
Fragments of prayers, advertisements, headlines, lines from songs, his 
speaking transforms into a ceaseless wave of meaningless words. It is 
as if he had been cursed, caught in a modern Tatarus. When he finally 
stops, exhausted, the conversation apparently continues in his head, a 
torture that again makes him frantic. Not until much later, almost at the 
end of the journey, is Parzifal saved from the heap of meaningless let-
ters. He can suddenly listen. Speech comes to him, alien and familiar. He 
slowly constructs new words, letter for letter, discovering them as if for 
the first time. “Wind, Sky, Dust, Water.”22 The spoken is created through 
speaking. Parzifal can call it up so that when he says its name, it is there. 
Wide-eyed he speaks word by word by word.
The same irritating phenomenon that can be observed in movement on 
stage is observed in language. All acts associated with language that come 
to us so easily in our daily lives – speaking, hearing, answering, and even 
being silent – lose their naturalness. They are called into question, create 
surprisingly complex problems.
Debutant actors are confronted with the problem that their speech 
does not obey them. Above and beyond the question of function – the 
workings of the breathing and speaking apparatuses that must first be 
trained – they find that they cannot speak, that they cannot hear, that 
they are not able to think the text that they have learned. They speak 
without being involved in what they are saying at the moment in which 
they speak it, and as a result they do not really understand what they are 
saying. Because they are concentrating so much on themselves and on 
their acting, they tend to not really listen to what their partner is saying. 
He or she becomes a mere prompter. All their attention is focused on it’s 
22 Peter Handke, Voyage to the Sonorous Land or The Art of Asking, trans. Gitta Honegger 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 61–62.
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my turn soon, my text is coming, now I need to speak. They are absorbed by 
their own action, by how to “do” it, how to “shape” the next sentence, the 
next word. O no, that horrible word is coming, the worst sentence. How can 
I say it so it sounds right? In this way, the actor manipulates, illustrates, 
and illuminates, but he doesn’t listen, so he can’t answer. No dialogue 
is born, no shared imagination; one person does not inspire the other. 
Listening and answering, the central acts of all creative collaboration, are 
neglected, passed over. They become missed opportunities.
One could say that in speaking, he forgets to listen to the text, to what 
he is saying, saying to another actor. The spoken text is actually nothing 
but an answer to what has been heard and answered within the text. For 
this reason, actors often fail because their approach to language is too 
instrumental. If they are too interested in forming the text and not pri-
marily in understanding its meaning, the latter is lost to them and to the 
audience. It becomes intangible. Words become empty shells, decorative 
sentences that taste like cardboard and are unable to develop performa-
tive power. What is said begins to merge with overemotionalism, which 
may be interesting at first but soon becomes boring.
It is always the same. The sovereignty of the will, its dominance and con-
current wish to succeed hinders the act of acting. As regards his body 
and his speech, the actor cannot get around the hurdle of his profession: 
that his role is not only to act but also to be a medium. There is no way 
to solve this problem “reasonably.” He owns neither his body nor his 
speech, even if both belong to him. Like his body, his speech does not let 
him use it as he will. It refuses to be manipulated. It does not obey him. 
If he tries to exploit his speech, to force it, to wring meaning out of it, 
it turns against him and refuses to surrender. It flees into arbitrariness, 
striking, but simple. The words sound as if they had been learned by rote; 
they become wooden, painted. They illustrate their meaning but remain 
empty, mere black-and-white print. Oratory. What is said becomes 
empty rhetoric and cliché, text that obfuscates meaning.
In Austria, the infamous repertoire of director Fritz Kortner is often 
repeated in rehearsals as a kind of shorthand for confronting these 
problems: “Don’t say disgust and loathing like it’s a Jewish company!” Or 
“Stop playing oak-birch!” Isn’t Kortner’s snappy commentary also an 
example of all speaking without thinking? And don’t “weighty oaks” and 
“whispering birches” also contain all of theater’s false tones?
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Of course, technical ability is important to felicitous speech and to 
speaking on stage. That is beyond a doubt, even if skill is losing its repu-
tation. Without techne, without technical skills, without training, there 
would be no professional theater. An untrained voice that does not know 
about breathing and rhythm, that comes from the wrong place and does 
not project, will hardly be able to use its full facilities and will soon give 
up the ghost. When vocal cords are strained and overexploited, it hurts 
– both speaker and listener, whether because, for example, the actor’s 
voice is in his throat and cannot resonate in his body, or because of the 
unthinking, inflationary use of language.
Two things are necessary at the same time – surrender to and respect 
for language. The actor must both give language itself center stage and 
at the same time dedicate his entire palpable body to language. He can-
not own it or treat it with disrespect. In both cases it pulls away, lapses, 
remains bland, flat, without vigor, without flesh, without eventfulness. 
Speech and speaking will not be subjugated or held liable. They are very 
sensitive to being treated carelessly. The magical depths of theatrical 
speech and speaking are only plumbed in the word that the speaker 
sends out beyond himself into the fathomless profundity of the silent 
and invisible web of meanings that accompany it. This is the web every 
good actor spins, even in what he does not say, even in the unsayable. 
Only careful listening allows such speech to speak through the actor, 
not the other way round. It is speech that speaks.23 No philosophical 
knowledge is needed to understand this, only experience. It is speech 
that, going through the actor – back and forth between presence and 
absence – strikes a chord. In the kairos of this speech, behind what is 
said there is a glimpse of its possible meaning and at the same time the 
impossibility of comprehension. “Wind, Sky, Dust, Water.”
Digesting speech
To learn a text so that it can be repeated by heart means to hold it inside 
your body. To do so, it must be read, its words must be picked out, col-
lected.24 They must be brought in, committed to memory, scanned so to 
23 On this, see Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
24 The first meaning in most etymological dictionaries for the Greek verb legein, the root of 
the word lecture, the action of reading, is to pick out, to select, to collect, to enumerate, 
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speak, so that they can be repeated automatically. The text must be saved 
internally, so that it can be re-collected at will from this inner archive. 
The German phrase for “to learn by heart” is auswendig lernen, literally to 
learn by turning outward. Such learning turns both inward and outward. 
It is a process with two mutually reinforcing aspects that belong together.
Not until this process of incorporation is complete has the text been 
completely understood, not just by the intellect, but by the entire body. 
Incorporation of a text is a complex learning process that functions 
similarly to the digestive system.25 It takes time. It is often misconceived 
as a mechanical act of repetition, tedious learning by rote as so many 
people remember doing at school.
But it is more than that. An actor needs to almost eat his text, and 
to do so with enjoyment, like a gourmet delicacy. He must chew slowly 
and thoroughly, and the more his appetite increases, the richer the text 
becomes. The nuances of flavor are only brought out by slow and repeated 
chewing. If in contrast an actor simply swallows his text quickly, or if 
he inhales it mechanically as quickly as possible, its quality is lost. It is 
understood only superficially. Undigested. Not until all of a text’s elements 
have been broken down has it been processed completely. Only then can 
it be drawn from by an actor while playing, without effort, automatically 
and reliably. A text that has not been incorporated completely can dis-
appear. In the heat of emotions it is forgotten. The actor’s memory is a 
clean slate and his feelings have erased it. The actor draws a blank, as it is 
called. And even if he remembers his lines, the text is still only “hot air.” 
The audience sees an excited actor, but does not really understand why. 
That is boring, and the audience soon loses interest. But if a text has been 
incorporated, remembered with the physical body, then affect, logic, and 
logos are joined and can be released to play at any time. The text can 
be repeated at will as if reinvented, as if it had just been found, giving 
pleasure to all. And it can be repeated not just once but again and again 
and again – without ever becoming rote or mechanical. And the more 
poetic a text it is, the richer it becomes through repetition, since more 
can be found and understood in it and thus played with all the more.
and only its second meaning is to say, to speak, to tell, to declare, etc. The substantive is 
logos.
25 On mind or spirit as a question of nutrition and digestion, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce 
Homo, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21f.
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Counterwords
When speech is released into a state of suspension between the audible 
and the inaudible, the heard and the unheard of, it releases additional 
energy – at least for a moment. In that moment, the force of a single 
cry is enough to turn deathly emptiness into hope, or hope into deathly 
emptiness. Lucille’s scream in Georg Büchner’s drama about the French 
Revolution is such an outcry.26 Historically, it is the senseless rebellion 
of the human being who believes he can perhaps stop death at the last 
second after all. But no one hears him, neither man nor God, and eve-
rything continues as usual. The clocks tick, the bees buzz, time trickles 
away and takes life with it. Camille dies his bloody death on the scaffold, 
as do Danton and the others. No scream can prevent it. But there is a 
word that can turn it around. Paul Celan calls it the “counterword, it is 
the word that cuts the ‘string,’ the word that no longer bows down before 
‘the bystanders and old war-horses of history.’”27 Lucille dares to speak 
this counterword. At the very end of the play, sitting on the steps to the 
guillotine, she cries out to one of the revolutionary guards, “Long live 
the King!” Are these the words of one who has been driven mad by her 
lover’s murder? Celan reads it differently, as an act of liberation, a step 
with a direction.
The counterword the actor is able to speak, that does not bow to the 
bystanders and old warhorses of contemporary or ancient theater his-
tory, is how Lucille’s cries cry out. How, the manner in which this scream 
is screamed, can be an act of liberation. In this scream, the actor risks the 
bareness of existence without calculating the effect, not showing off her 
virtuosity, not following a particular method. This does not mean she 
has no knowledge of effect, virtuosity ,and methods, but that is not all.
The how of such a scream can cut the strings on which the automaton, 
man the marionette, dangles and opens onto a world that is also there, 
namely, a world that has not yet completely finished with its past, but 
where the past can continue to be written and where the sanctity of all 
26 Georg Büchner, Danton’s Death, trans. Henry J. Schmidt, in Walter Hinderer and Henry 
J. Schmidt (eds.) Georg Büchner. Complete Works and Letters (New York: The Continuum 
Publishing Company, 1986), 123.
27 Paul Celan, The Meridian: Final Version, Drafts, Materials, trans. Pierre Joris, Bernhard 
Böschenstein and Heino Schmull (eds.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 193.
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possible futures has always already been violated and at the same time 
overtaken. This is the muse’s view, the turn, the breathturn and the beauty 
of performative art.
It [beauty] steps forward namelessly as a secret: Its mysteries outline 
the “bareness of form.” [ ... ] It is part of, participates in, the uniqueness 
of the moment. For this reason it allows, beyond language, solely an 
imperative of showing: “look!” or “hear!”28
In light of the aesthetics of contemporary theater, again almost dogmatic 
in a perverse reversal, we can translate Lucille’s cry “Long live the King!” 
as “Long live beauty!” This is not meant to conjure up some preserved 
yesteryear, to continue along Celan’s lines. We are not paying homage to 
some ancien régime, but rather to a yet-to-come régime de l’avenir.
“Long live beauty” is a call to beauty that appears suddenly, a moment 
of extreme vulnerability and porosity. Beauty as a breathturn, attentive 
to the big affirmation.
Why do you want to be an actor?
Perhaps that is why.
The Other, the others
Theater needs counterparts, a face vis-à-vis. It needs the Other, the oth-
ers. There is no theater without the presence of others. You need actors 
and audience. Theater is a shared art, based on shared corporeal pres-
ence, and is thus an art of the moment under the gaze of the Other.
Gazed-upon moments are always also risky moments. You can never 
know beforehand how they will be answered or what will come of them. 
If you open yourself to the gaze, you must surrender to a stranger, to an 
Other. That can have fatal consequences and trigger events you never 
would have thought of and cannot imagine beforehand. A momentary 
glance can change everything that has gone before – like Joan of Arc’s 
look into the eyes of Lionel in Friedrich Schiller’s Maid of Orleans – and 
28 Dieter Mersch, “Schönheit oder die ‘Blöße’ der Form,” in Ereignis und Aura (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 127.
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inadvertently make you face the tragedy and riddle of non-identity into 
which it plunges you. It can also bring to light that which might oth-
erwise have remained hidden and untouched in the dark, because it is 
confrontational, painful, and threatening.
The power of the gaze can cause calamities. It can objectify others, 
betray, curse, and cut. As the saying goes, a look can even kill. One 
involuntary gaze into the eyes of Medusa can turn you to stone, and fear 
of the evil eye is found in almost all cultures reaching back to the begin-
ning of history.
Another momentary gaze is needed for interplay on stage. This is another 
desire altogether. Perhaps it has its roots in the “penetrating eyes” related 
to Dionysus,29 which inspire and are the source of the bottomless res-
ervoir of creativity. It is a gaze meant to challenge, not harm, others, 
not even by the distortions of idealizing. It is open to and unafraid of 
the future, and is therefore not a slave to the prejudices that dazzle and 
delude us and judge Others without seeing what they can do. Instead, it 
is fundamentally welcoming to the Other and wants to open all options 
for him, make all avenues possible. Such a gaze is fundamentally gener-
ous and passionate, willing to risk a love-gaze and trusting that it will 
be able to distinguish strange from stranger, so that it does not expose 
itself naively to the destructive Other. And if Medusa does stare back – 
something that has been known to happen even in the most beauteous 
temples of the muses – the gaze is averted in time or lets itself come to 
the test. For who, in the kairos of time, has exhibited more potency – 
Eros the matchmaker or the demon Negativity?
When the interplay goes well, Eros has a good chance. In the kairos of 
the moment, the gazes of homo ludens lock on stage in the shared eros of 
the creativity of the muses. And what kind of coupling would it be if one 
cut the other off in the name of his own pleasure and advantage? That 
would be a poor showing and not a felicitous act, even if one of the two, 
much acclaimed, believed himself to be the winner.
Victorious moments, gazed upon in theater and smiled upon by the 
muses, have another look to them. They are not self-centered nor do 
they know self-denial. Rather they are fed by the understanding that 
29 Walter Otto, Dionysus Myth and Cult, trans. Walter Palmer (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1965), 90.
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each experiences his own potency only in collaboration with others, that 
couplings bring forth life and that the quality of one is dependent upon 
the quality of the other. But dependency does not, as is often believed, 
revoke freedom. In creative interplay, dependency is a prerequisite for 
maximal freedom, for the freedom of play. Actors know, or at least intuit 
“that the true site of originality and strength is neither the other nor 
myself, but our relation itself.”30
“It is the originality of the relation which must be conquered” so that the 
play can be a success, a felicitous event. That is why the space surrounding 
actors’ relationships is neither the ego of one nor the ego of the other, but 
their cusp, in between the two. It is the hyphen of the open moment that 
both separates and joins, like the fond gaze that enables both actors to 
transcend themselves in play(ing) without losing their own individuality. 
From the paradox of with-out me, a web is spun between them (Greek: 
hyphe-web, hyphen-together), held by the finest of threads, and when 
it works, “when the relation is original, then the stereotype is shaken, 
transcended, evacuated, and jealousy, for instance, has no more room in 
this relation without a site, without topos.”31 Response and responsibility 
meet.
When all senses are penetrated in this way, and one’s very existence 
merges with others, doesn’t it bring ethics and aesthetics in the closest 
proximity? Isn’t one precondition of the art of ensemble acting a regard 
for the exposed defenselessness of the other(s) and respect for the face of 
the other?32
Through this connection, the actors break through, throw off the 
pretenses and prejudices their past has conditioned them to carry. 
Regarding one another, they give each other space, create a shared space, 
one through the other, for the unexpected, the unforeseeable, leading 
one another. This happens not only during rehearsal, when putting the 
play together, but also in every staging of the performance. Performative 
quality always necessitates drawing from the past and anticipating the 
30 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (Toronto: Harper 
Collins, 2001), 35.
31 Ibid., 35–36.
32 Emmanuel Levinas, “Exteriority and the Face,” section III in Totality and Infinity, trans. 
Alphonso Lingus (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 187–253.
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future; it requires reliable memory, and an open playing ground, whether 
in the jungle or in the garden.
In terms of temporality, you could say that the event of acting always 
unifies past, present, and future.33 Their fixed sequence is jumbled up in 
the kairos of time, becomes open, and is rejoined in each moment. The 
actors never stop wandering backward and forward with one another in 
a strange land, a no man’s land, into the unknown. This unknown exerts 
a pull on all players who, in the sensate desire for growth, bend toward it 
and incorporate it. In their shared joy and in their shared fear they spend 
themselves and find themselves in the pathos of laughing and crying 
about exposing themselves so, knowing they are exposed together.
Post scriptum. Luckily, often enough the dilemma of exposure dissolves 
in the blink of an eye, in the spoken words. Actors wink at each other, 
and the prompt box of their mind sends sentences such as “I will show 
myself highly fed and lowly taught”34 – by which all weight is thrown off 
and scampers away.
Affect versus thought
We need to return to the idea that thinking is the enemy of performative 
talent and that affect is the enemy of philosophical or scientific integrity. 
Why? Because preconceptions are tenacious and hard to exterminate. 
Borrowing from Nietzsche we can say they are as “ineradicable as the 
flea-beetle” and “live longest.”35 Of course, they are always playing games. 
They like to sneak in wherever they can, excrete their poison, let off 
steam. The advantage of this is clear. You yourself are not guilty, you have 
an excuse, a scapegoat. Sigmund Freud and Nietzsche shake hands with 
one another. They pronounced the correct diagnosis. Ressentiment and 
transference are the ruling powers, and we can only ever be relatively free 
of them: “The spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the subject of 
man’s best reflection; and where there was suffering, one always wanted 
33 On the ecstatic unity of temporality and the ordinary (vulgar) concept of time, see section 
IV of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
34 William Shakespeare, All’s Well That Ends Well, in The Illustrated Stratford Shakespeare 
(London: Chancellor Press, 1992), 264–289.
35 Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” in The Portable Nietzsche, 129.
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punishment too.”36 Vindictiveness is powerful and tenacious. It rips the 
potential out of life, and can poison it permanently.
But if we look more closely at actors and feelings and start with the com-
mon reproach that actors are guided by their emotions, do we not have 
to admit that the actor’s typical weak spot is, in truth, affect? Aren’t 
actors always a little bit too loud, a little bit too excited, a little bit too 
weak of will, too worried about the impression they make? Aren’t they all 
too ready to ride the waves of their emotions? Aren’t their feelings always 
jumping here and there, unfaithful and dangerously easy to seduce? 
Aren’t there enough contemporary examples of this in political history? 
Aren’t actors per se refugees of reason?
The actor has spirit, but little conscience of the spirit. Always he has 
faith in that with which he inspires the most faith – faith in himself. 
Tomorrow he has a new faith and the day after tomorrow a newer one. 
He has quick senses [ ... ] and capricious moods.37
Or do we need to turn what we have said about the actor’s disposition 
on its head and concede that the actor’s occupation forces him to ride 
the waves of emotion? What else could he do? You cannot swim or act 
on dry land. Acting is overflowing, chaotic, passionate, peripheral and 
proliferative. Is there more? Not even Brecht could have worked with 
actor cut-outs. Only a philistine can therefore demand the following of 
an actor:
First, the collegium logicum.
There will your mind be drilled and braced,
As if in Spanish boots 'twere laced,
And thus to graver paces brought,
'Twill plod along the path of thought.38
Isn’t Mephistopheles’ mockery reminiscent of the way actors ridicule 
theory? Doesn’t he go on to say, “gray are all theories, / And green alone 
36 Ibid., 252. 
37 Ibid., 164.
38 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust I, trans. Bayard Taylor (Renaissance Classics, 2012), 
63–64. Italics in the original.
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Life’s golden tree”?39 Sitting in a musty study or going out and grabbing 
life by the horns – it is not really a hard choice. This comparison is 
illuminating. Book learning evokes the famulus Wagner from Goethe’s 
Faust, a bone-dry, boring, bourgeois representative of reason. Not a very 
popular role. Immediately you think of the color gray. Already you have 
taken sides, and this time it is not the emotions that lose, but thinking. 
Yet Mephistopheles’s mockery goes deeper. In his counsel to the student 
he is not mocking thinking as thinking per se, but a particular kind of 
thinking. He is ridiculing a manner of thought that abstracts from the 
physical, from the world of the senses, even if advice such as the follow-
ing: “To lead the women, learn the special feeling! / Their everlasting 
aches and groans, / In thousand tones, / Have all one source, one mode 
of healing”40 might cause the mouths of some of this ilk to water and 
their pants to secretly bulge. But didn’t Eve and her apple bring all this 
sin and misery upon humankind?
Today, we can replace the rationalist image of thinking with an intel-
lectualist41 image that believes it can rigorously distinguish between the 
content and performance of the act. Intellectualist thinking establishes 
a hierarchy between speech and speaking. It insists on the purity of a 
true or false content independent of the situation, the context, the tonal-
ity, and the gesture inherent to a sentence. They play no role in creating 
meaning. The grammatical or pragmatic rules of language determine 
what is “true” and what is “false.”
The famulus Wagner can breathe a sigh of relief.
Performative intelligence is intuitively opposed to this kind of 
theoretical thinking. It rightly senses that it is counterproductive in 
performative art. It curbs, restrains, and constrains creativity, even 
punishes it. Acting is not a logical mathematical problem that must add 
up to the sum of its parts. Its result cannot be calculated. It is sensuous, 
contradictory, performative, and ecstatic. It thus always also includes an 
incalculable, unpredictable moment, an increase of being. The result of a 
performance is not logical, but ontological. It cannot be summed up with 
39 Ibid., 69.
40 Ibid., 68.
41 On the intellectualist image of language, see Sybille Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, 
Kommunikation. Sprachtheoretische Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001).
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arguments. Its character is more of an erotic nature. Desirable, coupled. 
Every performance is a copulation, a copula,42 an amour fou.
But from the vantage point of the collegium logicum it is of course a 
threat, an aberration both parasitical and arbitrary. It is an epicenter of 
uselessness, and actors are the potential do-no-gooders; they are a luxury 
that productive members of society allow themselves. The principle of 
non-contradiction is ignored, the excluded middle forgotten. A is not 
A, but rather A plus n. The outcome is always wrong; miscalculations 
abound. Gaps appear, empty spaces, unexpected differences. This space 
of difference, this desired, hidden space of the incalculable, is the site of 
the treasure of the actor’s performative art.
Now somebody lifts a finger admonishingly.
Is it the old doomsayer from before?
People are vindictive. Why not allow ourselves a small pleasure? How 
would the honorable famulus Wagner feel if he were on the receiving 
end of a droll speech such as that delivered by Mephistopheles to the 
student? Shocked, he would no doubt flee instantly into his lonesome 
room and pull the covers up over his head ... 
But who knows?
The performative is always full of surprises.
Mephistopheles’s clever play with the traveling student is full of surpris-
ing turns. It is a wonderful example of the art of performative speech, 
which is why it so confuses the poor boy. In the end he no longer knows 
what is up or down. The devil’s learned words have turned him topsy-
turvy. The most confusing thing is not even what Mephistopheles says, 
but how he says it. It is the way he uses words and concepts to underscore 
his arguments that the student finds absurd, objectionable, even inde-
cent. And it is the way he stares, laughs at the wrong time, and reaches 
for the student. That sets off the student’s internal alarm, but he does not 
know where the fire is. Mephistopheles’s arguments and proofs take on 
one meaning and then another. They vacillate, oscillate, like a true cha-
meleon. They attack with an adroit sticky tongue, and the student falls 
for it each time. But the most confusing thing is that despite all the back 
and forth, the words and sentences remain logical in and of themselves. 
And so consistent! But their sound, their sound, and all the other trappings!
42 F.W.J. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1975), 38.
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In the end, it is “like a dream” to the student.43
Can’t we ourselves take a new turn here and “dream,” even assert that 
within the event of acting, thinking and emotionality are intertwined in 
a fruitful intimate dynamic? And that this event is not about liberation 
from affect, but the cleansing of affect to reveal its thoroughly noble 
quality, its ennoblement.
But how exactly is this expressed in emotions? By regarding, by train-
ing regard for, others and their alterity. This slowly drains ressentiment 
of its poison. Face to face there can be no more objectification and no 
judgment. A gaze into the face of the Other and the response made 
has to do with respons-ibility. By sensitizing and training the senses in 
this way, the stage becomes the site of an ethics of responsivity, a site of 
experiencing and re-membering (anamneses) the importance of alterity. 
Preemptively.44
Would this not in the end be “like a dream” for us?
Thinking and acting
Both thinking and acting reject conformity and civility. It is useless to try 
to play one against the other. Neither takes well to being normed. And if 
they do subject themselves to social mores, they stop being playful and 
thoughtful; they stop going beyond themselves; they long no longer; 
they turn our minds to prisoners. Our intellect is tied up and enslaved. 
The “Spanish boots” have us under their heel. Thinking and playing are 
right where they want them: conformist, obedient, and ready to draw 
the right conclusions, just as Mephistopheles mockingly advises.
But this is the wrong track for acting and for thinking. Their path is 
different. Don’t both need to give themselves up to pleasure in the event 
of playing, the event of thinking? Don’t both want to go to the limits 
of their possibilities? Don’t both want to challenge their times? Don’t 
both dare to transcend their times? Aren’t both obsessed with the unan-
swerable question of why something is something rather than nothing? 
Aren’t their questions about the meaning of being human, the sense and 
senselessness of our existence, almost libidinous? Questions that point 
43 Goethe, Faust I, 69.
44 See Mersch, Ereignis und Aura, 9–21.
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continuously toward absence; toward openness and emptiness; toward 
freedom.
All actors (no matter what their type) who care about more than 
just their own pleasure, who believe not only that they have a fantastic 
job (which they do) but also that they are dedicated to the pleasure of 
art, agree that they must dedicate themselves to this openness, this free 
space, this porosity.
Actors can be “soothplayers,”45 because they create transparency. They are 
artists who can be “transparency personified”46 in the limelight, so that 
at the end it is not they but “the audience who go home as actors – that 
is, confirmed in their own ways as players; that only in this transpar-
ency [actors] created could they realize that this is what they themselves 
embody.”47
Emulating and mirroring the world is important and engaging. The his-
torical gaze, the mimetic copy are very useful. The knowledge and ability 
we draw from them deliver elementary tools for both thinking and act-
ing. But the libido of acting and thinking is hardly satisfied by looking 
into the mirror, by mirroring the splendor and ruin of our world. Doesn’t 
the event of thinking and the event of acting – in which past, present and 
future come together felicitously – necessarily cause a fracture in every 
observation based on constative observation? It is a fracture of continu-
ity – a promise of “another beginning” within the world, within art. Not 
that either the world to date or its art has ever fallen into that fissure, but 
the self-conceptions that ruled them have often done so.
When thinking and acting become an event, there is always a connec-
tion to the invisible, the inaudible, the not-thought. There is a trace 
of the above-named copula, the connection, the link – or perhaps the 
covenant, the yoke, but not the yoke of oppression. Thinking and act-
ing have no interest in force, in taming, or in imprisoning. Neither do 
they want to placate, reassure, or gloss over. They want to be a thorn 
in the flesh, a thorn of attentiveness, penetrating the crust to make it 
permeable, to open eyes and ears and to rupture the skin. In the event of 
45 Peter Handke, 13.
46 Ibid., 14.
47 Ibid.
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acting, as in the event of thinking, the body becomes porous, the skin a 
dissoluble boundary; an opening onto the exterior world. This does not 
have the calming effect of illusion; it packs a punch, it spares no one. The 
others also become porous, electrified, their lives lit up, turned upside 
down. A peripeteia of the body–mind (physio-logical) condition by re-
membering the ecstasy of our existence.
In the fairy tale, Snow White is kissed awake in the kairos of time after a 
hundred-year sleep and many senseless deaths in the hedge of thorns.
Yes, maybe like that.
We are simply fools of the theater.
Repetition
Wouldn’t it be much more useful to learn by heart the lessons life teaches 
us, repeating them again and again rather than falling in love with and 
running after some foolish, senseless ideal? Instead of hoping that you 
could “see the top of [your] head for once.”48 Would that help us? In the 
end we would only have wasted time uselessly and, like Büchner’s hero 
Danton, be sad about our lives:
But time loses us. It’s very boring, always putting on the shirt first and 
the pants over it and going to bed at night and crawling out again in 
the morning and always putting one foot before the other – there’s no 
hope that it will ever be any different. It’s very sad; and that millions 
have done it this way and millions will keep on doing it – and, above 
all, that we’re made up of two halves which do the same thing so that 
everything happens twice – that’s very sad.49
Nonsense! cry the loudspeakers of the happy market economy.
The power of repetition is fatal – for happiness and for unhappiness. It 
swings back and forth from compulsion and virtual potency, between 
compulsive repetition and future faculties, between stencils and 
48 Georg Büchner, Leonce and Lena, trans. Henry J. Schmidt, in Walter Hinderer and Henry 
J. Schmidt (eds.), Georg Büchner. Complete Works and Letters (New York: The Continuum 
Publishing Company, 1986) 165.
49 Georg Büchner, Danton’s Death, in Georg Büchner. Complete Works and Letters, 80.
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metamorphosis. From desired to damned, from loved to feared, it revels 
in its comedies and tragedies, its scandals and triumphs.
It is a key that is difficult to fit to the art of acting. In the artistic code 
of the theater, in contrast to our usual understanding, repetition does 
not mean always the same. You cannot duplicate a production. Acting 
in the theater is not a technical reproduction that can be played at the 
press of a button. It is not always the same film, even if the same play 
is produced and the same text is spoken. A production is not a closed 
circle, and actors do not clone themselves. That would quickly be boring. 
The play would have no air to breathe, the greatest effort would be for 
nothing, the words would not grow wings; rather, they would stick to the 
paper they were written on, remain dead, morphemic corpses. The plot 
would plod, a merely theoretical vessel. You might as well buy the theater 
program and just read it instead. A “mechanical” repetition squanders 
the most beautiful and difficult aspect of theater: the possibility it holds 
of eventfulness. In doing so it cheats the audience of live observation, 
which is probably, in our media-saturated world, what still draws people 
to the theater; assuming they are not satisfied with mere representation 
on stage and in the auditorium, but that their pleasure in theater is drawn 
from the endless openness of everything that lives.
Yet again, once more, one more time for the umpteenth time. These words 
also have a whiff of coercion and of compulsion that robs us of our 
freedom when they emerge all powerful from our subconscious. But 
theater has nothing to do with this, even if actors are sometimes plagued 
by a theatrical superego in the form of directors, managers, and critics. 
Unlike compulsive repetition, an actor’s repetition is joyful, happy. It is 
not beyond, but within the pleasure principle.50 It is the pleasurable site 
of creativity, the pool of regeneration.
Why?
Each performance is a repetition of the performance before it. Either 
way. Whatever it was, it was. When the lights go down, the curtain falls, 
the actors have taken their bow and returned to their dressing rooms, 
and the audience has gone to get their coats; the performance is over, 
50 “But we come now to a new and remarkable fact, namely that the compulsion to repeat 
also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure.” Sigmund 
Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18. (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1971), 20.
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finished, completed. But, and this is what’s fantastic about theater, on the 
next night, the next performance date, it can be repeated and new life 
can be breathed into it at each repetition. It can be repotentialized.
What does that mean?
Each individual performance is saved in the actor’s memory as a result 
of the rehearsal process – all directions, all the right and wrong turns, 
thoughts, feelings, texts, contexts, appearances, entrances, exits – the 
entire fabric of scenes and dialogues. They have been inscribed within 
him and memorized. He can draw from them and play them again and 
again, and each performance lays down another memory pathway, so that 
his archive continually becomes fuller and richer. But only if the actor 
risks what has been before and frees it can he again electrify it. Only if he 
time and again and once more risks opening his acting to the uncertainty 
of his movements does a performance take off. This act of creative repeti-
tion is what makes acting so electrifying. It is its aesthetic desire, for the 
actors and for the audience. It opens all involved to a temporal piece of 
art that defies common sense, the reason of the everyday. Or perhaps it 
opens them to the gift of the muses that allows the dawning of an era 
in which the law of chronology no longer holds. The actor looks to the 
remembered past. He brings it into the present word for word, situation 
for situation and at the same time sends it into the future word for word, 
situation for situation by taking all that has happened and again exposing 
it to the openness of the present. In this way, he secures the future of his 
acting. There is no closure, because it is reopened in every performance. 
The actor may be chained to the chronology of the plot and to a certain 
setting, but in the kairos of time – in the present, past, and future – he 
can again find, recognize, develop, and remember new and ever more 
complex meanings in the play and its performative form. He can make 
good on something he maybe owes the play. He can go back to what has 
been in time and make up for lapses after the fact.
For this reason the difference in each repeated performance is always 
also an act of freedom and of liberation, an act of regeneration.51 He over-
turns the past and present because the future acts within him – always 
unique, always singular. For this reason it is not the same performance 
that is given each evening in each show with the same name, but each 
51 Arno Böhler, “Nietzsche – Vom regenerativen Charakter des Gemüts,” psycho-logik 2, 
Existenz und Gefühl (2007).
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performance keeps its initial character and each repetition is bound to 
transgress the boundary of what has once been this way or that. This is 
the struggle or favor of theater in the actor’s art of repetition. His acting 
in the present must always be coupled to what has been and what will be, 
whether he succeeds or fails.
Discovering and reviving the gap inherent to the future breathes new 
life into the act of all action, all emotions, all thoughts, and all speech. 
Without this difference52 it is impotent, and it has no animating aura. 
Only if the play is performed from the very gut of the actor’s archive, 
only if it is played as if it has just been discovered and spoken for the first 
time do the actions within it acquire meaning – even that which can-
not be explained and remains mysterious. Without this difference and 
without the corporeal commitment to this difference, the actor would be 
nothing but a marionette whose mechanics could at most be hidden by 
the telescope of representation.53
By initializing and preserving this immanent difference in every repeti-
tion, the actor repotentializes his performance.54 It becomes pneumatic. 
This is how he can escape the drudgery of doing one and the same thing 
each night and breathe new life into the play without it remaining one 
and the same, and also without willfully breaking with the performance 
that was worked upon and that the company agreed upon. In triggering 
difference, a play and its text begin to live, to speak; they begin to speak to 
the audience. The words take on physicality. They develop intensity as a 
material quality. They are charged and penetrate hearts, loins, and minds 
to spin their sensuous net of meanings and connections. Each word is 
just the tip of an iceberg. All actions are only what is visible of much 
more complex interconnections that reach into what is absent, missing, 
and incongruous.
Such a flowing repetition, and that which can be seen in it, can get you 
hooked, can hang its barbs onto the most inaccessible reaches of your 
subconscious.
Is this art not yet another reason to want to become an actor? 
52 For a concept of thought that matches this, see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
trans. Paul Patton (New York: Athlone Press, 1994).
53 Hoffmann, The Sandman.
54 Böhler, Singularitäten, 165–183.
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Figure 6.1 One of eight Dionysus masks made for the chorus in the lecture performance Nach(t) 
der Tragödie (After/The Night of the Tragedy). Courtesy of GRENZ_film, böhler&granzer, 2010. 
Mask designed and created by Elisabeth Binder-Neurue.
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Heiner Müller: I am a land surveyor
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One could say that the basic element of theater, and of 
drama too, is transformation, and that death is the last 
transformation. The only thing common to everyone in 
the audience, that can make an audience one, is the fear 
of death, everyone has it ... and the effect of theater rests 
on this only commonality. The foundation of theater is 
therefore always a symbolic death.55 
55 Alexander Kluge and Heiner Müller, Ich bin ein Landvermesser, 176.
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Jean Paul: First Flower-Piece 
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Frozen, dumb nothingness! Cold, eternal necessity! [ ... ] 
How lonely is everyone in the wide charnel of the universe! 
[ ... ] Alas! If every being is its own father and creator, why 
cannot it also be its own destroying angel? [ ... ] Look down 
into the abyss over which clouds of ashes are floating by. 
Fogs full of worlds arise out of the sea of death. The future 
is a rising vapour, the present a falling one. [ ... ] And after 
death [ ... ] when the man of sorrows stretches his sore 
wounded back upon the earth to slumber towards a love-
lier morning [ ... ] no morning cometh.56 
56 Jean Paul, Flower, Fruit and Thorn-Pieces, trans. Alexander Ewing (London: George Bell, 1892), 280–281.
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